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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on fi rms’ investment 
decisions. We focus on Spain for the period 1998-2014. To measure policy-related uncertainty, 
we use a new macroeconomic indicator constructed for this country. We fi nd strong evidence 
that policy uncertainty reduces corporate investment. Furthermore, the heterogeneous results 
suggest that the adverse effect of policy uncertainty is particularly relevant for highly vulnerable 
fi rms. In particular, non-exporting fi rms, small and medium enterprises, as well as fi rms in 
poorer fi nancial condition are shown to decrease investment signifi cantly more than their 
counterparts. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses that policy-related 
uncertainty reduces corporate investment through increases in precautionary savings or to 
worsening of credit conditions.
Keywords: corporate investment, policy uncertainty, fi nancial frictions.
JEL classifi cation: D80, E22, G18, G31, G38.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza el impacto que la incertidumbre acerca de las políticas económicas tiene 
sobre las decisiones de inversión de las empresas. Para ello se hace uso de una muestra 
de gran tamaño de empresas no fi nancieras españolas, para el período 1998-2014. La 
incertidumbre se mide utilizando un nuevo indicador, que resume la información contenida en 
un conjunto de variables referidas a España. Los resultados muestran que un incremento de 
incertidumbre reduce la inversión empresarial. Asimismo, los resultados obtenidos indican que 
la incertidumbre tiene un impacto negativo mayor sobre la inversión de las empresas altamente 
vulnerables. En particular, el impacto es más acusado para las empresas no exportadoras, las 
empresas pequeñas y medianas, y aquellas empresas que presentan una posición fi nanciera 
menos robusta. En general, estos resultados son coherentes con el supuesto de que el 
impacto de la incertidumbre acerca de las políticas económicas sobre la inversión empresarial 
se produce como consecuencia de un incremento en el ahorro por motivo precaución o por 
la mayor difi cultad de acceso al crédito. 
Palabras clave: inversión empresarial, incertidumbre política, fricciones fi nancieras.
Códigos JEL: D80, E22, G18, G31, G38.
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1 Introduction
Corporate investment is a key factor in sustaining the productivity and long-term economic
growth of firms. The slow recovery of corporate investment in the aftermath of the Great Re-
cession has renewed interest in the drivers of corporate investment and spurred the debate on the
effects of uncertainty on real economic variables.1 The working hypothesis is that uncertainty
exacerbates the consequences of downturns (Bloom, 2014). In particular, aggregate uncertainty
has been increasingly recognized as an additional relevant determinant of investment decisions.
New evidence from the European Investment Bank Group Survey on Investment and Invest-
ment Finance (EIBIS) supports the hypothesis that uncertainty affects investment in Europe.2
According to the 2016 wave, uncertainty is the most reported obstacle for long-term investment
in the European area. 75% of European firms report that uncertainty about the future has been
an obstacle in their investment activities, followed by availability of staff with the right skills
(71%), and business regulation (64%). In addition, the political and regulatory climate is seen
as a major impediment to carrying out planned investment in the short-term.
A growing empirical literature focuses on the impact of aggregate uncertainty on macroe-
conomic dynamics.3 Only a few studies investigate this issue from a micro perspective and
all focus on the US (Baker et al., 2016; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Bonaime et al., 2018). To our
knowledge, there is no evidence available on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on in-
vestment at the micro-level for Europe.4 We aim to fill this gap by providing new evidence
for Spain. We exploit firm-level panel data for this European country to analyze the effect
of macroeconomic policy uncertainty on investment and its potentially heterogeneous effects
along the cross-sectional dimension.
The literature focusing on the relationship between uncertainty and investment proposes
different channels that may be in place. First, this relationship has mostly been studied through
the lens of the real option literature. In the presence of even partially irreversible projects and
informational frictions, uncertainty may increase a firm’s incentive to delay investment projects.
Under high levels of uncertainty, firms exercise “the option value of waiting”, which ensures
access to additional information. This generates the so called “wait-and-see” effect, which
impacts both the timing and level of investment (e.g. Bernanke, 1983; Bertola and Caballero,
1The recovery was sluggish especially in US and Europe. In Spain it started in 2013 after the sovereign debt
crisis and investment reached the pre-crisis level in 2017. In many other EU countries the recovery was slower.
2EIBIS is a EU-wide firm-level survey that collects information on firms’ investment activities, their financing
requirements, and the difficulties they face.
3E.g. Bloom et al. (2007); Bloom (2009); Bachmann et al. (2013); Jurado et al. (2015); Basu and Bundick
(2017). For Spain, see Gil et al. (2017).
4A number of papers study the impact of firm-level uncertainty on investment: e.g. Guiso and Parigi (1999);
Bontempi et al. (2010) for Italy.
1994; Abel and Eberly, 1994; Dixit and Pindyck, 1991).
Another recent branch of the literature points towards financial distortions as the most im-
portant mechanism through which uncertainty may affect investment decisions (Gilchrist et al.,
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5E.g. Fazzari et al., 1988, Bond and Meghir, 1994, Hennessy et al., 2007 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2018.
6Bianco et al. (2013) show that family firms’ investment is sensitive to firm-level uncertainty and relate this to
the fact that family firms’ owners may be more risk-averse as they hold large shares of wealth in the firm.
7The literature proposes alternative proxies to capture specific facets of uncertainty: e.g., stock market volatility
(Bloom, 2009); expectations dispersion (Bachmann et al., 2013); newspaper-based index of policy uncertainty
(Baker et al., 2016); volatility of unforecastable components of several time-series (Jurado et al., 2015).
8Other studies use elections as an instrument for political uncertainty: e.g., Julio and Yook (2016) focus on
foreign direct investment of US companies, using elections in host countries as an instrument; Jens (2017) exploits
US gubernatorial elections to study the impact of political uncertainty on firm investment.
2014; Christiano et al., 2014; Arellano et al., 2016). Financial constraints may significantly
affect investment through the cost of raising external finance. In other words, firm-specific
characteristics determining credit-worthiness and access to credit – namely, the firm’s balance
sheet structure, debt burden and profitability – are found to influence investment decisions
through the credit channel.5 The work of the previously mentioned authors adds that financial
frictions may also exacerbate the negative effect of uncertainty. Arguably, periods of higher
uncertainty, conditional on other determinants, may affect access to credit as banks become
more restrictive in granting loans. The “financial frictions” channel thus highlights the role of
the effective supply of credit as a main channel through which uncertainty affects investment.
Finally, a third possibility is that firms react to high uncertainty with precautionary savings.
This holds if firms are risk-averse (Jurado et al., 2015; Femminis, 2012; Saltari and Ticchi,
2007).6 This channel suggests that credit shrinkage associated with high uncertainty periods
may be demand driven, as opposed to the financial frictions story, which offers a supply-driven
explanation of credit crunches.
Uncertainty is not a clear-cut concept.7 We focus on policy uncertainty, which refers to situ-
ations characterised by increased dispersion in agents’ expectations about governments’ future
policy stands. The intuition is that greater uncertainty about possible changes in government
policies may induce firms to delay investment so as to gain additional information, or may
prevent them from investing due to increased financial frictions or increased risk aversion.
Measuring uncertainty is a major difficulty of this stream of literature. Julio and Yook
(2012) study the impact of political uncertainty on corporate investment for a large panel of
countries. They use elections as a source of exogenous variation in political uncertainty that
is not correlated with the business cycle and show that firms reduce investment when elections
approach.8 Shoag and Veuger (2016) construct a measure of US state-level uncertainty based
on counts of local newspaper articles related to economic uncertainty and investigate its effect
on state-level unemployment.
Baker et al. (2016) construct the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index for the US and
many other countries.9 The index for the US is based on three components: (i) the volume of
newspapers’ articles containing words related to “economy”, “policy” and “uncertainty”; (ii)
an index of about future tax changes; (iii) an index measuring forecasters’ disagreement about
consumer prices and fiscal policies. In their empirical application, they use this indicator to
9These indexes are available online at .
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document the real effects of policy uncertainty based on firm-level data. In the same spirit,
Gulen and Ion (2016) investigate the impact of policy uncertainty on US corporate investment
using the Baker et al. (2016)’s EPU index.10 Both studies document the adverse effect of policy
uncertainty on the corporate investment of publicly listed firms in the US. In line with the wait-
and-see channel, this effect is particularly strong for firms with a high degree of irreversibility
and those dependent on government spending.
Gil et al. (2017) construct a measure of policy uncertainty for Spain. We employ their
macroeconomic indicator in our empirical analysis. It is a synthetic measure resulting from
a principal component analysis which combines several policy related aspects and includes
measures of the cross-sectional dispersion of individuals’ expectations and opinions about the
current and future political situation, a measure of political risk, the EPU index constructed
by Baker et al. (2016) for Spain, and an indicator of the degree of disagreement in budget
deficit forecasts. Gil et al. (2017) use this synthetic indicator to investigate the real effects
of uncertainty at the macroeconomic level, based on vector autoregressive models. They find
adverse effects of uncertainty on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumption, and especially,
capital goods investment. We complement this evidence by providing new evidence of the
effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment in Spain, based on firm-level data.
We estimate a classical investment model augmented to explicitly account for the impact
of aggregate factors in order to identify the average effect of policy uncertainty on the gross
investment-to-capital ratio. We use panel data methods to account for firm-specific unobserved
heterogeneity. According to our baseline model, an increase in policy uncertainty of one stan-
dard deviation decreases the investment rate by about 3.2 percentage points. To give a sense of
the magnitude of this effect, consider that the policy uncertainty index increased by one stan-
dard deviation between 2008 and 2011, i.e. at the start of the financial crisis. In addition, we
study heterogeneous effects along a number of cross-sectional dimensions, such as the firm’s
orientation to export, its financial position, and whether the firm belongs to a corporate group.
We find that exporting firms are less affected than non-exporting firms, which can be explained
by the fact that exporters may be less sensitive to domestic policy uncertainty since they oper-
ate in foreign markets. In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and firms in
10Bonaime et al. (2018) use the same index to study policy uncertainty effects on mergers and acquisitions.
poorer financial condition decrease investment significantly more than their counterparts, while
firms that belong to corporate groups are less affected by policy uncertainty shocks than non-
member firms. Belonging to corporate groups, a practice that has been increasing in Spain since
the Great Recession, may be a strategy for small firms to overcome informational and finan-
cial frictions in the credit market. To the extent that belonging to corporate groups facilitates
access to banking finance, both results are consistent with the idea that part of the explanation
for the negative relation between political uncertainty and corporate investment may be related
to the financial frictions channel (supply-driven credit tightening). This is also in line with the
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11According to the EIBIS survey, 40% of investment by Spanish firms in 2015 relied on external finance. Spain
is ranked fourth among EU countries in terms of external finance usage. 75% of external finance relates to bank
loans. This makes Spain one of the EU countries relying most intensively on bank lending (second only to Cyprus).
risk aversion story: in this case, the decrease in investment may occur via demand-driven loan
reductions for financing investment projects or an increase in precautionary savings.
Our analysis contributes to this stream of literature in two ways. First, our sample is based
on annual firm-level data from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Survey of the Bank of
Spain. Our sample not only includes quoted companies but also SMEs, which represents more
than 95% of all firms in Spain. Thus, with this significant population coverage, the current
work can complement the existing evidence that refers to publicly listed US firms.
Second, we investigate the heterogeneous effects of uncertainty by the financial position
of the firm, focusing both on firm-specific characteristics determining credit-worthiness and
access to credit, and the role of belonging to a corporate group. This allows us to explore the
potential role of risk aversion and financial frictions as channels through which uncertainty
shocks may be amplified. The latter is extremely relevant in Spain since credit borrowing is
by far the most important source of external finance for corporate investment.11 All in all, our
evidence is novel in allowing us to speculate on the relative importance of the aforementioned
channels as an explanation for the negative impact of uncertainty on corporate investment in
Spain.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature
and outlines our expected results based on the theoretical predictions discussed therein. In
Section 3 we present our uncertainty indicator and the firm-level data used in the analysis. The
empirical strategy is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the results. Robustness
tests are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature and theoretical predictions
Our work is mostly related to that of Gulen and Ion (2016) and Baker et al. (2016), both of
whom study the relationship between firm-level capital investment and policy-related uncer-
tainty for publicly listed firms in the US. They use the aforementioned Baker et al. (2016)’s
EPU index to measure uncertainty. Gulen and Ion (2016) find a strong negative relationship
between aggregated policy uncertainty and corporate investment. In addition, these authors
study potential cross-sectional heterogeneity in the uncertainty–investment relationship. The
negative effect is greater for firms facing a high degree of investment irreversibility and for
those that are more dependent on government spending. Their results provide evidence that
the wait-and-see effect may be an important channel for US-listed firms. Baker et al. (2016)
slightly change the research question, shifting the focus from studying the average effect of
policy uncertainty on corporate investment to studying the particular channels through which
the adverse effect of policy uncertainty materializes. They also focus on the differential ef-
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12The role of uncertainty in supply credit tightening has been empirically corroborated (e.g. Alessandri and
Bottero, 2017; Buch et al., 2015). Bordo et al. (2016) find that aggregate uncertainty raises the average cost of
debt, indicating a deterioration in the access to credit.
fect of policy uncertainty along a measure of exposure to government purchases. The working
hypothesis is that policy uncertainty matters most for policy-sensitive sectors and firms react
to high levels of policy uncertainty by postponing investment decisions. They find that the
negative effect of policy uncertainty on investment rate and employment growth is most pro-
nounced among firms largely exposed to government purchases, which is also in favor of real
option models.
Therefore, the existing evidence for publicly listed firms in the US corroborates the wait-
and-see effect. However, it does not discuss the other two channels proposed by the literature
(financial frictions and risk aversion), which also make important theoretical predictions.
According to the financial frictions channel, access to credit may decrease in periods of
high uncertainty and this may induce firms to delay investment. In this case, the decision to
delay investment stems from the credit supply side and is sub-optimal from a firm’s point of
view. Therefore, as long as firms rely on external funds to finance their investment projects
and uncertainty shocks imply credit tightening, firms that are more exposed to financial fric-
tions will be more severely affected by uncertainty shocks, namely those in a more precarious
financial position.12
In addition, firms may become more risk-averse in periods of high uncertainty and decide
to decrease investment. The risk aversion channel may lead to an increase in precautionary
savings or a decrease in the demand for loans (if firms finance investment though bank lending).
This has important consequences for the long-term economic growth of the economy, since
economic activity and entrepreneurship naturally come with a certain amount of risk.
We posit that the financial frictions and risk aversion channels may also be relevant to
explain the adverse effect of policy uncertainty on investment, especially for SMEs or firms
that rely on bank lending, and we investigate this for the case of Spain.13 We explore this
by means of our heterogeneous effects analysis (see Section 5.2). In the rest of the section,
we summarize our expectations of the heterogeneous results in view of the aforementioned
channels.
• Leverage and profitability: There is evidence that, caeteris paribus, firms in poorer fi-
nancial condition and with a lower profitability profile encounter more difficulties in
accessing credit markets. Therefore, we expect the negative effect of uncertainty on cor-
porate investment to be higher for firms with higher leverage and lower profitability. Two
effects may be in play. On the one hand, according to the bank lending channel, higher
uncertainty will induce a credit supply shock that will affect firms asymmetrically: firms
in a weaker financial position will be more affected. On the other hand, a credit demand
13Since the recovery (from 2013), Spanish firms increased extensively internal financing to finance investment.
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effect may also be in place. Firms in a weaker financial position may reduce their de-
mand for credit relatively more than firms in a sound financial position when faced with
uncertainty. This is compatible with the risk aversion story.
• SMEs: We expect that the negative effect of uncertainty on investment is greater for
SMEs than for large firms. This may be related to the fact that the former face higher
informational frictions, which may be relevant in determining growth opportunities but
also in accessing financial markets. As long as informational frictions increase during
periods of uncertainty, SMEs will be more affected. Lastly, as SMEs are more vulnerable
to shocks, they may increase their aversion to risk when policy uncertainty is high. Thus,
in this case, the three channels may affect SMEs to a greater degree.
• Exports: The investment behavior of exporter firms may be different to non-exporters for
two main reasons. First, exporters face an international demand and operate in foreign
markets. They may therefore be less sensitive to (domestic) uncertainty. Second, as long
as exporting firms also exhibit a sound financial profile, they will be less sensitive to
the bank lending channel through which uncertainty may affect investment. However,
given that we control for firm-specific characteristics associated with the latter point, the
main channel we have in mind would be more related to the advantages that come with a
geographically diversified demand.
• Corporate groups: The empirical literature does not provide clear-cut conclusions on the
implications of belonging to a corporate group. On the one hand, if corporate groups
are less affected by financial frictions, firms belonging to corporate groups may be less
vulnerable to uncertainty shocks, and enjoy better credit conditions. On the other hand,
uncertainty shocks may be amplified within corporate groups due to contagion effects.14
Our claim is that belonging to a corporate group may be related to lower financial fric-
tions, caeteris paribus. In Section D of the Appendix, we provide descriptive evidence
that firms belonging to a corporate group enjoy a lower cost of debt (controlling for rele-
vant firm-specific characteristics), and hence better credit conditions.
In the following section we describe our macroeconomic policy uncertainty indicator and
the firm-level data used in the analysis.
14On the one hand, associations entail a lower risk of non-repayment than individual firms (Inderst and Müller,
2003; Faure-Grimaud and Inderst, 2005). Better access to credit may be also related potential debt coinsurance
provided by a conglomerate structure (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2016; Yan et al., 2010). On the other hand,
while conglomerates may benefit from economies of scale in the access to credit, contagion effects due to idiosyn-
cratic shocks among firms may prevail over coinsurance gains (Hege and Ambrus-lakatos, 2002).
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15Uncertainty comprises two concepts: risk and Knightian uncertainty. Risk relates to situations where the
outcome of an event is not known but the probabilities of potential outcomes are, so that the odds of the event can
be computed. With Knightian uncertainty, not only is the outcome is unknown, but one also does not have the
necessary information to compute the odds of potential outcomes. As common in this literature, our indicator of
uncertainty encompasses both concepts and refrains from distinguishing between them.
16This is due to data availability. For more details, see Gil et al. (2017).
3 Data
We now describe the data used in the analysis. Section 3.1 presents our policy uncertainty
indicator, explains how it is constructed, and why it provides a reliable measure of policy
uncertainty for this country. In Section 3.2 we outline the firm-level data used in the empirical
exercise.
3.1 The policy uncertainty measure
We measure policy uncertainty using a new aggregate index constructed by Gil et al. (2017) for
Spain.15 It is a synthetic measure that combines information reflected in a number of distinct
indicators associated with policy-related uncertainty. This indicator has been constructed for
the period 1997-2016.16
Gil et al. (2017) consider the following indicators: (i) an indicator of individuals’ opin-
ions about the current political situation; (ii) an indicator of individuals’ expectations about
the future political situation; (iii) an indicator of political risk; (iv) the EPU index for Spain;
Figure 1: Policy uncertainty index
This figure depicts the monthly policy uncertainty indicator constructed by Gil et al. (2017) for Spain. Its values
represent the distance in terms of standard deviations to the mean for the period 1997-2016.
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17These indexes are computed as weighted averages of the shares of alternative answers.
18The PRS Group uses the International Country Risk Guide method and considers these dimensions: govern-
ment stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal and external conflicts, corruption, military
in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
19When constructing this index, Gil et al. (2017) account for the disagreement about GDP forecasts in order to
isolate the genuine disagreement in public deficit forecasts.
and (v) an indicator of disagreement about public deficit forecasts. Index (i) and (ii) are based
on monthly survey data gathered by the Spanish Center for Research on Sociology (CIS). In
particular, they rely on individuals’ answers to two questions asking participants to assess the
quality of the current political situation (from very good to very bad) and whether they expect
the political situation to be worse, the same, or better in the future.17 Index (iii) is constructed
by the PRS Group and is a weighted average of measures related to government stability, so-
cioeconomic conditions, and the quality of institutions.18 Indicator (iv) is constructed by Baker
et al. (2016) based on counts of articles in two Spanish newspapers (El país and El mundo)
containing simultaneously words related to the notion of “uncertainty”, “economy” and “pol-
icy”. Lastly, index (v) is calculated as the cross-sectional dispersion of public deficit forecasts
provided by a panel of experts.19 This survey is run by Funcas, a Spanish foundation. Intu-
itively, this index measures the degree of disagreement between experts’ expectations about
fiscal policy. A more dispersed aggregate distribution of agents’ expectations indicates higher
uncertainty (e.g., Bachmann et al., 2013). Each of measures (i)-(v) capture specific facts of
policy-related uncertainty. Gil et al. (2017) combine all information contained in each of these
single measures by means of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This allows to obtain
a measure of uncertainty that is more complete and less volatile that any of the single uncer-
tainty indexes used in the PCA. The resulting synthetic policy uncertainty indicator is the first
principal component extracted from the PCA.
The evolution of the policy uncertainty indicator is shown in Fig. 1. Our uncertainty proxy
seems to be jointly capturing two relevant aspects. First, the index increases when events oc-
cur that are generally considered to be related to policy uncertainty. For instance, the policy
uncertainty indicator is high at the time of the Greek bail-out request in April 2010, and of the
Spanish request for financial aid in June 2012. It also picks when Brexit takes place. Another
example may be periods just before general political elections. Electoral campaigns can in-
crease policy uncertainty depending on agents’ expectations about the outcome of the election
and whether agents believe that the announced political stands will be followed coherently after
the election.20 According to Fig. 1, policy uncertainty increased during the most recent Spanish
general electoral campaign. This suggests that the index takes higher values in periods when
policy uncertainty increases.
Second, in contrast to other events such as the invasion of Iraq, the specific events occurring
during the financial crisis have not only resulted in peaks in our proxy, but also an increasing
trend that reverts only after the Spanish bank rescue package. In other words, the construction
20This is not necessarily the case and depends on the dispersion of citizens’ expectations about future policies.
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of the measure correctly captures the accumulated political uncertainty that built up after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and not just non-persistent shocks. This is relevant since firm-
level variables are measured annually, and hence our analysis is able to detect the impact of
uncertainty for shocks that are quite persistent.
Table 1 shows the correlation between the policy uncertainty index and its components.
The components that are most closely correlated to our policy uncertainty indicator are the
index related to individuals’ opinions about the current political situation and the political risk
index (with a correlation of 0.9). By contrast the EPU index shows a weak correlation of 0.2.
Hence, our indicator mostly reflects the assessment of political stability in the country, as well
as citizens’ opinions about the current political situation.
Since we use yearly firm data, we aggregate the monthly series of uncertainty at the annual
level. To do that, we take a weighted average of monthly values for each calendar year and
assign increasing weights to later months.21 Since in our empirical analysis the uncertainty
indicator is lagged by one year, this means assuming that the uncertainty related to the later
y p p p p
21For each month m = 1, ...12, the weight is m/12. Hence, December is given weight equal to 1 while January
is given weight equal to 1/12.
Table 1: Correlation matrix for the policy uncertainty indicator and its components (monthly
obs.)
policy U (i) pol.sit. (ii) exp.pol.sit. (iii) pol.risk (iv) EPU (v) dis.pub.def.
policy U 1.00
(i) pol.sit. -0.94 1.00
(ii) exp.pol.sit. -0.68 0.50 1.00
(iii) pol.risk -0.90 0.91 0.40 1.00
(iv) EPU 0.28 -0.21 -0.06 -0.15 1.00
(v) dis.pub.def. 0.28 -0.13 -0.21 -0.18 -0.12 1.00
months of year t−1 is more likely to have an impact on firms’ decisions in t than the uncertainty
related to the beginning of year t− 1.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the yearly policy uncertainty index, showing our annual
weighted average construction against the original monthly variation. The political uncertainty
index shows an upward trend in the period of interest. As expected, policy uncertainty is coun-
tercyclical and as suggested by Bloom (2014), the measure may actually be reflecting economic
conditions. A major challenge we face in our analysis is disentangling the effect of policy un-
certainty from other aggregate time-varying confounding factors (such as macroeconomic vari-
ables) that may explain investment. Our baseline analysis controls explicitly for the business
cycle by including the GDP growth rate. In addition, in Section 6.1, we discuss the robustness
of the heterogeneous results by further controlling for time fixed effects, which allows us to
account for any aggregate factors that may be correlated with both uncertainty and investment
decisions.
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Figure 2: Annual policy uncertainty index
This figure plots the original monthly index of policy uncertainty constructed by Gil et al. (2017) against the
annual weighted average of policy uncertainty that we use in this analysis.
3.2 Firm-level data
We use firm data from the Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office Survey (CBI) of the
Bank of Spain. This database includes data reported in the CBA Annual Survey by non-
financial firms, as well as administrative data from the accounts filed with the mercantile reg-
istries. Overall, the CBI has a wide coverage of the Spanish non-financial sector, representing
around 50% of non-financial corporations in 2015 (Bank of Spain, 2016). Firm data is available
on an annual level.
Our analysis relies on an unbalanced panel of a representative sample of Spanish firms for
the period 1998-2014.22 We apply standard cleaning procedures to firm data and consider firms
that are observed at least twice in the period of study (1998-2014). Table 9 in Section B of the
Appendix shows the panel structure of the data.
The final sample contains more than 3 million firm-year observations for a total of 616,740
firms. Table 8 in Section A of the Appendix compares the distribution of our sample to that of
the population of Spanish firms for the period 1999-2014, as provided by the Central Directory
of Firms (DIRCE). Overall, we observe a good representativeness of our final sample, although
it is slightly underrepresentative of small firms, especially during the first years of the sample.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for firm-level variables in the final sample. 1.3% of these are
large firms, while all others are SMEs. Exporting firms and firms belonging to a corporate group
represent small fractions of the sample. The gross investment-to-capital ratio is positive for
22We cannot consider years before 1998 because our uncertainty index is available from 1997 and all regressors
are lagged by one year. The timespan ends in 2014 because we include information on exports, which is available
until 2013. If we excluded export variables, we could extend the analysis to the period 1998-2016.
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22We cannot consider years before 1998 because our uncertainty index is available from 1997 and all regressors
are lagged by one year. The timespan ends in 2014 because we include information on exports, which is available
until 2013. If we excluded export variables, we could extend the analysis to the period 1998-2016.
74% of observations in the sample, indicating that a large proportion of firm-year observations
in the sample are characterised by investment (in gross terms). The average gross investment
rate amounts to 13% with a standard deviation of about 26 percentage points (pp). This suggests
that the gross investment rate shows important variation in our data. This can also be seen
in Figure 3 in Section B of the Appendix, which shows the evolution of the average gross
investment rate over time. Between 2007 and 2009, the average gross investment rate drops by
about 7 pp and maintains a lower level thereafter.
4 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify the contribution of macroeconomic policy uncertainty to firms’ investment
decisions, we estimate static investment equations by means of panel regressions as in Gulen
and Ion (2016) and Baker et al. (2016). Our baseline model is a classical investment equation of
this type, augmented to control for both firm-specific investment predictors and macroeconomic
conditions:
(I/K)it = αi + β1Ut−1 + β

2 X it−1 + β

3 M t−1 + it (1)
Index i and t refer to the firm and the calendar year, respectively. αi indicates firm fixed effects.
The dependent variable is the gross investment rate, which is defined as gross fixed capital
formation over total capital stock. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year in order to
minimize endogeneity concerns. X is a vector of relevant firm-level characteristics explaining
investment: we include variables that characterize the financial position of the firm (i.e. debt
burden, debt rate, and cash flows), its profitability (ROA), future growth opportunities (i.e.
mean sd min max N
ROA 0.049 0.170 -1.676 0.721 3,318,739
Debt burden 0.581 0.954 0.000 2.771 3,318,739
Debt rate 0.693 0.454 0.000 4.830 3,318,739
Cash flow -0.002 0.133 -0.979 0.920 3,318,739
Sales growth 0.050 0.534 -1.000 10.289 3,318,739
SMEs 0.987 0.114 0.000 1.000 3,318,739
Export 0.030 0.172 0.000 1.000 3,318,739
Corp_group 0.004 0.065 0.000 1.000 3,318,739
1(Gross Inv.> 0) 0.738 0.440 0.000 1.000 3,318,739
Gross Inv.Rate 0.130 0.255 -1.594 2.143 3,318,739
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, full sample
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23We include SMEs, export, and corp_group in the baseline model since we are interested in the heterogeneous
effects of policy uncertainty along these dimensions. However, the firm fixed effects model poorly estimates the
coefficient of these variables due to their limited time variation. For this reason, the coefficients of these control
variables are not reported. In contrast, the fixed effect model correctly estimates the interaction of these variables
with the (time-varying) policy uncertainty index, which are reported and interpreted (see Section 6.1).
sales growth), and other potentially relevant features, i.e. being a small or medium enterprise
(SMEs), being an exporting firm (export), and belonging to a corporate group (corp_group).23
Our parameter of interest is the coefficient of the macroeconomic policy uncertainty indicator
(U ). We lag it by one year because it takes time for investment decisions to materialize and
we are interested in the causal effect of uncertainty. M is a vector of aggregate controls and
possible confounders of our uncertainty proxy.
Finally,  is the error term, which we cluster at the firm and year level by means of two-way
clustering (Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al., 2011). This enables us to simultaneously control
for serial correlation (i.e. observations of the same firm may be correlated over time) and
cross-sectional correlation (i.e. all firms are exposed to the same aggregate shocks each year).
This allows us to keep the panel data structure unaltered and provide correct inference for our
estimates (Petersen, 2009).
Since we include firm fixed effects, everything that is constant in time and firm-specific is
controlled for. Hence, the identification of the effects of firm-level factors relies on the variation
of firm-level variables over time, i.e. variation with respect to the firm-specific mean in the
observed period (within transformation). It must be noted that since policy uncertainty varies
over time but does not vary along the cross-section, we cannot include time fixed effects in our
equation. If we did, time fixed effects would absorb all explanatory power of any aggregate
time-varying variable, including our measure of policy uncertainty.
The main challenge of our estimation strategy is to properly control for aggregate con-
founders of policy uncertainty. Given that investment opportunities and demand expectations
are only partially proxied by firm-specific controls, investment decisions are expected to be cor-
related with the business cycle, which is itself correlated with residual investment opportunities
and demand expectations. Furthermore, policy uncertainty may be negatively correlated with
the business cycle and investment opportunities since policy makers often experience pressure
to make policy changes during times of recession. Thus, the effect of policy uncertainty could
be capturing the effect of poor investment opportunities (which are not controlled for by the
explanatory variables and are therefore unobservable to the econometrician). In our baseline
specification, we explicitly account for the business cycle by controlling for aggregate GDP
growth rate. This indicator, which is available at an annual level from the Spanish Statistical
Office’s (INE) webpage, is meant to capture the aggregate dynamics of investment opportu-
nities and expected demand.24 GDP growth rate and the policy uncertainty indicator show a
24There exists many alternative proxies for the business cycle, such as unemployment rate, Economic Sentiment
Indicator (ESI), etc. Our results remain robust to individually including the mentioned variables.
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25We compute the variance inflation factors (VIF), which is the diagnostic used for collinearity. The average
VIF for the baseline model is 2, while the VIFs associated with policy uncertainty and GDP growth rate are both
around 5. While there is no consensus on a VIF threshold indicating multicollinearity, V IF > 10 are often
considered alarming. Therefore, we believe that in our case, multicollinearity is of minor concern.
pairwise correlation of 0.9, i.e. they are highly linearly related. However, we check that such a
correlation does not lead to problems of multicollinearity in our regression.25
The following section discusses the baseline results. In Section 6.1, we discuss whether
our baseline results are biased by the omission of other aggregate factors that may affect both
policy uncertainty and corporate investment.
Table 3: Baseline model: average effect of policy uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA 0.026∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
debt burden -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cash flow 0.065∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
debt rate -0.036∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
sales growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
policy U -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP growth 0.004∗∗
(0.001)
GVA Sector 0.002∗
(0.001)
Time FE yes no no no
Observations 3318685 3318685 3318685 3318685
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.147 0.148 0.147
5 Baseline results
5.1 The average effect of policy uncertainty
We begin our empirical analysis by considering a classical investment panel regression with
time fixed effects (Column 1 of Table 3). Then, we drop time fixed effects in order to identify
the direct effect of aggregate policy uncertainty on the investment ratio.
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Note. This table reports results from estimating Eq. 1. The dependent variable is the investment rate. Firm FEs
are accounted for by means of the within transformation. Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year
level through two-way clustering. In all regressions, the firm-level covariates are: debt burden, debt rate, cash
flows, ROA, sales growth, SMEs, export, and corp_group (SMEs, export, and corp_group not reported).
Column 1 includes time fixed effects (not reported), as opposed to all other columns. Column 2 includes the
policy uncertainty indicator. Column 3 further includes GDP growth rate to the estimation in column 2. Column
4 replaces the GDP growth rate in column 3 with the sector-specific GVA growth rate.
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The first block of variables in Table 3 presents the role of traditional determinants of invest-
ment. No matter which specification is considered, these determinants appear to be significant
and present the expected sign in accordance with the literature. Both the debt burden and the
debt-to-asset ratio present a negative coefficient. This indicates that on average and caeteris
paribus, being in a weaker financial position negatively affects the level of investment. In
contrast, indicators of profitability such as the ROA ratio, and indicators related to future prof-
itability such as sales and employment growth, present a positive coefficient. Thus, our results
suggest that the financial and profitability position of a firm appears to affect the investment
ratio, as suggested by the literature, which highlights the role of financial frictions in accessing
external finance and in making investment decisions.
In column 2 of Table 3, we drop time fixed effects in order to include our policy uncer-
tainty proxy, which appears to negatively affect the investment ratio. However, as expected, the
magnitude of this effect decreases when further controlling for the business cycle, reinforcing
the above-mentioned need to control for potential confounders.26 As expected, lagged GDP
growth, which is a proxy for investment opportunities, positively affects the investment rate.
According to our baseline specification (column 3), a one standard deviation increase in the
uncertainty measure decreases the investment rate by 3.2 pp. To give a sense of this magnitude,
several things are worth noting. First, as documented in Section 3.1, our uncertainty index
represents the distance in terms of standard deviations from the mean for the period 1997-
2016. An increase of one standard deviation represents variation that is equivalent to episodes
characterized by a significant increase in political uncertainty, such as that experienced between
2008-2011.
Second, as illustrated in Fig. 3, the average investment rate has experienced fluctuations
of considerable magnitude throughout the business cycle. In particular, we observe that during
the financial crisis, investment decreased by about 7 pp. All in all, our estimation indicates that
uncertainty has a sizable effect on investment, although other determinants are also behind the
observed fluctuations in the investment ratio.
To further illustrate this issue, we compute a simple exercise to get a sense of the contribu-
tion of policy uncertainty on the evolution of the aggregate investment rate during the financial
crisis (for details, see Section C of the Appendix). Results indicate that the increase in policy
uncertainty between 2007 and 2010 would be accountable for roughly 30% of the 7 pp fall in
the average capital investment observed during this period. In this exercise, we maintain the
uncertainty level of 2006 constant and look at the predicted investment ratio according to our
26We expect the coefficient of policy uncertainty to be overestimated if the omitted variable is the business cycle.
Consider a simplified linear model: y = α + βU + γC + , where U is policy uncertainty, y is the investment
rate and C is the business cycle. By assumption: E(U) = 0 and E(C) = 0; we expect β < 0 and γ > 0. Let
Cov(U,C) = 0. If C is observed, β and γ are unbiased: β = Cov(U, y)/V ar(U), and γ = Cov(C, y)/V ar(C).
If C is omitted instead: β = E(U, y)/E(U)2 = E(U, βU + γC + )/E(U)2 = β + γ × Cov(U,C)/V ar(U).
The estimator of β is biased. The direction of the bias depends on the sign of the relationship between C and y
(γ) and the correlation between C and U . Since Cov(U,C) < 0 and γ > 0, the overall bias is negative.
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estimation. In the year 2007, the actual average investment rate was 17%. In 2010, the pre-
dicted average investment rate when fixing uncertainty at the 2006 level would have been 12%
rather than the observed 10%, remaining always above the observed level in the 2007-2010
period (see Fig. 4 in Section C of the Appendix). Thus, roughly 30% of the decrease in invest-
ment between 2007 and 2010 may be accounted for by the high levels of uncertainty following
the financial turmoil of 2008.
As a robustness check, we estimate the model by replacing the aggregate GDP growth rate
with the sector-specific Gross Value Added (GVA) growth rate.27 When sector-specific GVA
growth rate is included in the model, results are very similar to those we obtain when control-
ling for the GDP growth rate. The parameter in front of the GVA growth rate is positive and
significant, while the effect of policy uncertainty remains negative and significant, amounting
to -0.04, a slighly higher value than in the baseline model. As expected, this suggests that the
sector-specific GVA growth rate may not capture the business cycle as fully as the GDP growth
rate. As a consequence, the policy uncertainty estimator is slightly overestimated.
5.2 Heterogeneous effects
This section investigates the heterogeneous effects of policy uncertainty along a number of
cross-sectional dimensions. We are interested to test whether the macroeconomic policy un-
certainty has differential effects for certain types of firms, or if the effect of policy uncertainty
is the same for all firms. As discussed in Section 2, exporters should be less sensitive to do-
mestic policy uncertainty to the extent that they face external demand. Therefore, we expect
the impact of policy uncertainty to be higher for non-exporting firms. In addition, to the extent
that SMEs face informational frictions, they should be more vulnerable to changes in policy
uncertainty than big firms. This may occur through worsening of credit conditions or increases
in precautionary savings. Finally, firms in a weaker financial position may find it more difficult
to access credit markets. Hence, we expect them to be more exposed to macroeconomic policy
uncertainty in case of credit tightening.
To identify heterogeneous effects of policy uncertainty, the baseline specification becomes:
(I/K)it = αi + β1Ut−1 + β

2 X it−1 + β3Mt−1 + β4Ut−1 × Cit−1 + it (2)
where M represents the GDP growth rate. C is a firm-level control for which we compute
the heterogeneous effect and which we interact with the policy uncertainty indicator. Note, we
compute one heterogeneous effect at a time for the following variables: a dummy that equals
27The GVA growth rate shows higher variation than the GDP growth rate since the time variation faced by
firms is sector-specific. However, it relies on the hypothesis that firms are only affected by the business cycle of
the sectors in which operate, and that they are not affected by the business cycles of other sectors. This ignores
across-sectors spillover effects. By contrast, including the aggregate GDP growth rate implies assuming that all
firms face the same business cycle, regardless of the sector in which they operate, which seems more reasonable.
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one if the ROA is above the median, a dummy that equals one if debt rate is above the median,
SMEs, export, and corp_group. Since these variables are all dummy variables, the coefficient
β1 represents the effect of policy uncertainty for the baseline group (i.e. the group of firms such
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Note. This table reports results from estimating Eq. 2. Each column reports the coefficient of the macroeconomic
policy uncertainty index and the coefficient of the interaction between the latter and one firm-level variable. The
dependent variable is the investment rate. Firm FEs are accounted for by means of the within transformation.
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year level through two-way clustering. In all regressions, the
firm level covariates are: debt burden, debt rate, cash flows, ROA, sales growth, SMEs, export, and corp_group
(not reported). In column 2, we interact the policy uncertainty indicator with a dummy equal to one if the debt
rate is higher than the median. In column 3, the policy uncertainty index is interacted with a dummy equal to one
if the ROA is higher than the median.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
policy U -0.009 -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
U x SMEs -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
U x debt rate p[50-100] -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x ROA p[50-100] -0.007∗∗
(0.002)
U x export 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
U x corp_group 0.018∗
(0.007)
Time FE no no no no no
Observations 3318685 3318685 3318685 3318685 3273106
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.147
In column 2, we look at the differential effect of uncertainty on investment rate for SMEs.
We find a significant accentuation of the average negative effect for this group of firms, rela-
tive to larger ones. A one standard deviation increase in uncertainty entails a decrease in the
investment rate of less than one pp (not significant) in the case of large firms, while the same
change in uncertainty induces a 3.2 pp fall in the investment rate of SMEs. This finding sug-
that Cit−1 = 0), while β4 gives the differential effect of policy uncertainty for the other group
(i.e. firms with Cit−1 = 1).
Note that while the effects of constant or almost-constant firm-level characteristics are
largely absorbed by the fixed effects, proper identification of the corresponding heterogeneous
effects of policy uncertainty by these dimensions stems from the interaction of these variables
with our uncertainty measure, which varies over time (Wooldridge et al., 2001, Ch. 10.5).
Table 4: Baseline results: heterogeneous effects
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Significant heterogeneity is also found when looking at firms in poorer financial condition.
For a one standard deviation increase in economic policy uncertainty, the investment rate in-
creases by one pp for firms with a debt ratio above the median level. This finding may relate
to the bank lending channel, which predicts that uncertainty shocks will asymmetrically affect
firms that are not financially sound through an increase in the cost of debt and the tightening of
access to credit.
Heterogeneous effects along the profitability dimension suggest that highly profitable firms
(i.e. those with an ROA above the median value of the distribution) are slightly more affected
than their counterparts. We interpret this result as follows. On the one hand, the effect of policy
uncertainty on the investment decisions of profitable firms cannot be explained either by the risk
aversion channel (since, if anything, more vulnerable firms should be more negatively affected
by a policy uncertainty shock), or by the financial frictions channel. In fact, if the latter is in
place, we would expect more profitable firms to be less affected by a policy uncertainty shock,
since they enjoy better access to credit and, as a consequence, can smooth the negative uncer-
tainty shock if the investment is profitable. On the other hand, since the profitability of a firm
relates not only to lower financial frictions but also to other factors such as higher expected
growth and investment opportunities, our estimate could be consistent with the wait-and-see
channel. Firms with higher future growth opportunities may decide to delay (irreversible) in-
vestment projects in response to an increase in policy uncertainty. In other words, the greater
ability of profitable firms to optimally adjust their investment levels may induce these firms to
react to policy uncertainty by exercising the wait-and-see option.
Finally, we find significant differential effects for exporting firms and firms belonging to
a corporate group. We observe that being an exporter firm reduces the average effect of a
one standard deviation increase in uncertainty on investment rate by about one pp, while the
negative effect of policy uncertainty is further reduced up to 2 pp for firms belonging to a
corporate group. Thus, operating in external markets and belonging to a corporate group seem
to partially alleviate the detrimental effects of higher uncertainty levels. On the one hand, the
result for export can be rationalized by the fact that exporters are less sensitive to domestic
policy uncertainty because they face an international demand. On the other hand, the role
that corporate groups play in sheltering firms from uncertainty shocks may directly relate to
the bank lending channel, to the extent that belonging to a corporate group facilitates access to
credit. This should be particularly relevant for smaller firms, which face more financial frictions
and have more difficulties in accessing credit.
28Note, large firms comprise only 1.3% of our sample. We may not be able to detect a significant effect due to
the small proportion of this type of firm. In any case, the estimate is consistent with the idea that large firms are
less affected by policy uncertainty than SMEs, as expected.
gests that there is important heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty by firm size. According
to the estimates, SMEs bear almost all of the burden of policy uncertainty.28
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29To minimize endogeneity concerns (respondents with optimistic expectations are more likely to invest and
vice versa), we lag the indicator. Thus, we are explaining the investment rate in t with the firm-level sales growth
rate in t−1 (where the growth is computed by comparing the level in t−1with the one in t−2) and the sector-level
expectations about investment opportunities in t− 1.
30Results are available upon request. Note, this measure has a drawback in that it is based on managers’
evaluations (the survey asks if they expect future demand to be normal, high, or low), which may depend on the
cycle. For instance, the concept of “normal” demand may differ in upturns/downturns. This may bias the indicator.
31They are relevant since investment decisions are shaped by fiscal policy and the timing of such policies may
be correlated with the business cycle and policy uncertainty
6 Robustness analysis
6.1 The omitted bias problem
The main challenge of our estimation strategy (Eq. 1) is to properly control for aggregate
confounders of policy uncertainty. Investment decisions may be correlated with residual unob-
served investment opportunities and demand expectations, to the extent that the latter are only
partially proxied by firm-specific controls and the aggregate GDP growth rate. In this case,
the effect of policy uncertainty could be capturing the effect of poor investment opportunities.
Recall that we already control for future investment opportunities at the firm level by includ-
ing sales growth rate, as is standard in the literature. This variable (like all other firm-level
controls), is lagged by one year so as to minimize reverse causality concerns. However, the
baseline specification may not properly control for relevant aggregate measures of investment
opportunities that are not captured by the firm-level sales growth rate.
Aggregate measures of future investment opportunities are difficult to find and are highly
correlated with the business cycle. As a robustness check, we additionally control for a measure
of future investment opportunities at the sectoral level, which we compute based on the Busi-
ness and Consumer Surveys of the European Commission. We exploit questions asking firms
about their expectations regarding future demand trends and compute a sector-specific measure
of confidence about future demand.29 Results (not reported) are robust to this procedure and
the coefficient of the sector-specific investment opportunities has a positive and significant ef-
fect.30 In any case, the correlation between this indicator and the firm-level sales growth rate
aggregated at the sectoral level amounts to 77%. Such a high correlation suggests that firm-
level sales growth also appropriately controls for future investment opportunities at the sectoral
level.
Ultimately, to minimize the possibility of bias, we would need to explicitly include in the
model all relevant aggregate and time-varying confounders of the uncertainty–investment rela-
tionship. This is the empirical strategy followed by Gulen and Ion (2016). Possible candidates
for aggregate factors that may affect firms’ investment decisions are: measures of aggregate
future growth opportunities; legislated corporate tax changes;31 indicators about other relevant
types of uncertainties (such as financial uncertainty or uncertainty about future aggregate de-
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32Another stream of literature underlines the role of firm-level uncertainty about future demand on investments:
e.g. Guiso and Parigi (1999); Bontempi et al. (2010); Fuss and Vermeulen (2008); Bachmann et al. (2013); Leahy
and Whited (1996); Bloom et al. (2007). This is not possible in our case, due to data availability.
33The total effect of policy uncertainty for the group that is interacted with policy uncertainty is the sum of the
differential effect (the coefficient of the interaction) and the effect of policy uncertainty for the baseline group (the
coefficient of the policy uncertainty itself). The latter is absorbed by the time fixed effects.
mand).32 Note that a limitation of this strategy is that there is always the possibility that the list
of aggregate control variables is not exhaustive. Therefore, the possibility of omitted variable
bias remains.
In this section, we follow Baker et al. (2016) and present the results of an additional exer-
cise that allows us to overcome such limitations and provide additional evidence in favor of the
channels through which the policy uncertainty effect materializes (heterogeneous effects). In
particular, we modify Eq. 2 as follows: we include time fixed effects, drop the policy uncer-
tainty variable, and maintain the interaction of policy uncertainty with firm-level characteristics.
This is formalized in Eq. 3:
(I/K)it = αi + β

1 X it−1 + β2Ut−1 × Cit−1 + φt + it (3)
with C being a firm-level control for which we compute the heterogeneous effect. As in the
previous exercise, we compute one heterogeneous effect at a time for the following variables:
a dummy equal to one if ROA is above the median, a dummy equal to one if debt rate is above
the median, SMEs, export, and corp_group.
Note, the time fixed effects (φ) absorb the effect of all factors that are common to the
cross-section and that vary over time. This means that we can no longer identify the effect of
the policy uncertainty index as such (as well as the effect of the business cycle or the effect
of any other aggregate control variable), because they are collinear with time fixed effects.
However, we can identify the interaction between policy uncertainty and one specific firm-
level variable. This gives us a measure of the extent to which the investment rate of firms with
specific characteristics covaries with policy uncertainty. Table 5 presents the differential effect
of policy uncertainty for specific groups (the groups that are interacted with policy uncertainty)
compared to the corresponding baseline groups. Note, in contrast to Eq. 2, when time fixed
effects are included in the specification one cannot compute the total effect of policy uncertainty
by groups of firms, since the effect of policy uncertainty for the baseline groups is absorbed by
the time fixed effects.33
The following comments are worth mentioning. First, the coefficients of the interactions
in Table 5 are very similar to those displayed in Table 4. Since the interpretation of the in-
teraction variables is the same across both models, this means that the omitted variable bias
in the heterogeneous results based on the baseline model is negligible. Arguably, the fact that
the differential effects are stable across both specifications suggests that the results regarding
heterogeneous effects are robust.
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34The coefficient of the debt rate is not shown in Table 5 but it is negative and significant.
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Note. This table reports results when estimating Eq. 3. Each column reports the equation when interacting policy
uncertainty with different covariates individually. The dependent variable is the investment rate. Firm FEs are
accounted for by means of the within transformation. Time FEs are included. Standard errors are clustered at
both the firm and year level through two-way clustering. In all regressions, the firm-level covariates are: debt
burden, debt rate, cash flows, ROA, sales growth, SMEs, export, and corp_group (not reported). In column 2,
we interact the policy uncertainty indicator with a dummy equal to one if the debt rate is higher than the median.
In column 3, the policy uncertainty index is interacted with a dummy equal to one if the ROA is higher than the
median.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U x SMEs -0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
U x debt rate p[50-100] -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x ROA p[50-100] -0.003
(0.002)
U x export 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x corp_group 0.012∗∗
(0.003)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3318685 3318685 3318685 3318685 3318685
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.154 0.154
Second, the interaction with the debt rate remains negative and the interaction with the
dummy for belonging to a corporate group remains positive. The former result suggests that the
negative effect of debt rate on investment becomes larger during periods of higher uncertainty.34
In addition, belonging to a corporate group seems to shelter firms from the negative effect of
policy uncertainty on investment. Hence, our estimations seem to corroborate the hypothesis
that financial frictions, which are relevant in investment decisions, may be exacerbated during
periods of high uncertainty.
Third, the negative interaction between policy uncertainty and SMEs is in line with the
hypothesis that the latter may be more exposed to shocks in policy uncertainty, arguably due
to informational frictions. By contrast, the interaction with profitability is not significant (al-
though the sign remains negative). This offers weak evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
the negative effect of policy uncertainty is stronger for firms with a better profitability profile.
Finally, the interaction between the export dummy and policy uncertainty is positive and
significant. This is also consistent with previous results: exporting firms are less sensitive to
policy uncertainty since they have access to foreign markets.
Table 5: Heterogeneous effects including time fixed effects
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35In addition, since the fixed effects model exploits within-firm time variation, we might also be concerned
about the loss of observations with no variability in the observed period. However, this is only the case for 2% of
the firms in our sample.
36From a theoretical point of view, smoothing investment over time is rationalized by convex adjustment costs.
A static investment model is equivalent of ignoring adjustment costs of capital (or assuming linear adjustment
costs). That is, in each period the firm observes the shock and chooses tomorrow’s optimal capital stock regardless
of the current value of the capital stock.
6.2 Additional robustness checks
We perform two additional robustness checks.
In a first exercise we show that the results are robust when conditioned on strictly positive
investment, that is, when we restrict the analysis to firms that decide to invest (in gross terms).
Note that this restricted sample may be selective, which may prevent the making of inferences
about the entire population. However, unconditional estimates might be biased if the dependent
variable is not normally distributed. In our case, this might occur if there are a high number of
observations with values of the dependent variable equal to zero. However, note that the gross
investment rate is zero for 9% of observations. It can also be negative when firms decide to
reduce capital and liquidate assets. This occurs for 18% of observations in our sample. Hence,
we do not believe that the proportion of zeros in the dependent variable is a major concern.35
Results based on the sub-sample of observations with a strictly positive gross investment rate
are reported in tables 6 and 7. The coefficients of interest are close to those estimated for the
entire sample (unconditional estimates).
As a last robustness check, we consider the dynamic version of the baseline model, in which
the lagged dependent variable is included as additional regressor on the right-hand side of the
empirical specification. On the one hand, it is appealing to consider a dynamic investment
equation since it allows to model a partial adjustment mechanism in investment decisions.36
On the other hand, from an empirical point of view, adding the lagged values of the dependent
variable on the right-hand side of the equation introduces an endogeneity problem. This is be-
cause the within or first difference transformation needed to drop firm fixed effects introduces
a negative correlation between the transformed residuals and the transformed lagged dependent
variable. As a consequence, the estimate of the lagged dependent variable is biased downwards.
In addition, the estimated coefficients of the other regressors may be biased as well to the extent
that they are correlated with the lagged dependent variable. One way to tackle this problem is
to rely on the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), where the lagged values of the re-
gressors are used as instruments for the (endogenous) variables. Of course, as any instrumental
variable approach, GMM estimations rely on the validity of the chosen instruments, namely
relevance and exogeneity. In particular, the latter, known as the exclusion restriction, implies
that the assumptions should be assessed on a case by case basis.
For instance, in the difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), the model is
transformed in first differences, and the lagged values of the regressors in level are used as
instruments. The identifying assumption is that lagged values of variables are independent
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*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Note. This table reports results for firms with positive investment rate. Column 2 reports the baseline model (Eq.
1). Columns 2-5 report the heterogeneous results (Eq. 2). The dependent variable is the investment rate. Firm FEs
are accounted for by means of the within transformation. Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year
level through two-way clustering.
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Note. This table reports results when estimating Eq.3 for firms with positive investment rate. Each column reports
the equation when interacting policy uncertainty with different covariates individually. The dependent variable is
the investment rate. Firm FEs are accounted for by means of the within transformation. Time FEs are included.
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year level through two-way clustering.
Table 6: Baseline model and heterogeneous results conditional on a positive investment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
policy U -0.031∗∗ -0.010 -0.028∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.031∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
U x SMEs -0.021∗∗∗
(0.003)
U x debt rate p[50-100] -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x ROA p[50-100] -0.004∗
(0.002)
U x export 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)
U x corp_group 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
Time FE no no no no no no
Observations 2366581 2366581 2366581 2366581 2366581 2366581
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.183 0.182
Table 7: Heterogeneous results with time fixed effects conditional on a positive investment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U x SMEs -0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
U x debt rate p[50-100] -0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x ROA p[50-100] 0.000
(0.001)
U x export 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
U x corp_group 0.008∗
(0.004)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2366581 2366581 2366581 2366581 2366581
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.190 0.189 0.189 0.189
from future shocks. This is reasonable, unless one does not argue that firms anticipate future
shocks and change their behaviour accordingly. In addition, a limit of the difference GMM
is that for highly persistent variables the lagged values of the variables in level may be poor
instruments for their first difference transformation.
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An alternative is the system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998),
which augments the difference GMM with an equation in level and uses lagged differenced
variables as instruments for the variables in level. The additional assumption is that lagged
changes in the variables should be independent from firm fixed effects and future shocks. This
implies that the variables are mean stationary, i.e. firms of given type perform around their
steady state in the period of observation. This may be correct for mature firms, but harder to
assume for young firms which do not have yet reached their steady state level. In this case,
changes in the past values of the variables may be related to their firm-type.
In our case, the debt rate variable is very persistent (with a serial correlation coefficient of
0.9), while the profitability and the debt burden show a serial correlation coefficient of 0.47
and 0.45, respectively. Hence, using the lagged levels of these variables as instruments in the
difference GMM may not be desirable. As for using lagged differenced variables as instruments
in the level equation, this relies on the assumption that the variables are mean stationary. In our
case, this may not hold since our observation period includes the Great Recession which may
have induced a structural break in certain variables.
We estimate the dynamic equation using a GMM approach but the obtained results are
questionable, for the reasons illustrated above. The tests for the validity of the instruments (the
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the second order serial correlation test) lead us
to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. As a consequence, we refrain to use
a dynamic specification and rather maintain the static one as the main model, which provides
a cleaner setting to identify the coefficient of the macroeconomic policy uncertainty on firms’
investment decision. In addition, this choice allows us to compare the findings with those by
Gulen and Ion (2016) and Baker et al. (2016), which adopt the same empirical strategy.
7 Conclusion
This study exploits firm-level panel data to study the impact of policy uncertainty on corpo-
rate investment in Spain. We focus on the average effect of policy uncertainty on the gross
investment-to-capital ratio, as well as its heterogeneous effects along a set of firm-specific
controls that may be related to different channels for the effect of uncertainty. In order to mea-
sure the aggregate level of policy uncertainty in the Spanish economy, we rely on the policy
uncertainty indicator constructed by Gil et al. (2017). This measure results from a principal
component analysis that considers a number of indicators related to policy uncertainty.
The baseline model controls for the business cycle and aggregate demand by including the
aggregate GDP growth rate. This specification allows us to identify the average effect of policy
uncertainty on the investment rate, as well as heterogeneous effects according to firm charac-
teristics. As a robustness exercise, we replicate the heterogeneous results by further including
time fixed effects, which control for any aggregate time-varying factor affecting all firms over
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time. This minimizes the problem of omitted variable bias in estimating the heterogeneous
effects of policy uncertainty. This robustness exercise suggests that our heterogeneous results,
as well as the estimated coefficient of the effect of policy uncertainty in the baseline model, are
not biased by omitted aggregate factors.
The existing literature documents the adverse effect of macroeconomic policy uncertainty
on the investment decisions of publicly listed firms in the US. This paper provides similar
evidence for a representative sample of Spanish firms, most of which are SMEs and not quoted
on the Spanish stock exchange. We find strong evidence that policy uncertainty reduces the
rate of corporate investment in Spain. According to our baseline specification, a one standard
deviation increase in policy uncertainty decreases the average investment rate by about 3 pp. To
give a sense of the magnitude of this effect, we estimate that the increase in policy uncertainty
between 2007 and 2010 may be accountable for roughly one-third of the 7 pp fall in the capital
investment rate observed during this period.
The heterogeneous results indicate that the adverse effect of policy uncertainty is partic-
ularly relevant for highly vulnerable firms. Specifically, exporting firms are less affected by
policy uncertainty than non-exporting ones, presumably because they operate in foreign mar-
kets and are therefore less exposed to policy uncertainty. SMEs and highly indebted firms
decrease investment significantly more than their counterparts. In addition, firms belonging to
a corporate group are less affected by policy uncertainty shocks. To the extent that belonging
to a corporate group facilitates access to banking finance, these results are consistent with the
hypothesis that firms in a weaker financial position are more sensitive to policy uncertainty
shocks than their counterparts. This is in line with the idea that part of the explanation for the
negative relationship between policy uncertainty and corporate investment is the financial fric-
tions channel, according to which the credit supply shrinks when uncertainty is high and this
reduces investment spending. This channel may be particularly relevant in the Spanish context,
since corporate investment is largely financed by bank lending. Our results are also compatible
with the risk aversion channel, according to which firms may become more risk-averse during
periods of high policy uncertainty and hence reduce investment.
Ultimately, our findings have the following implication: investing firms like predictability,
and since corporate investment is a key driver of the growth of the economy in the long term,
policy uncertainty should be minimized. While some degree of policy uncertainty is intrinsic to
the democratic game and cannot be avoided, it could be certainly minimized if policy makers,
politicians, and institutions stick to credible announcements and consistent behavior. Such
an environment would set favorable conditions for economic agents to engage in investment
projects. In other words, not only does the content of implemented policies have real effects,
but the way in which policies are brought forward also shapes the decisions of economic agents.
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APPENDIX
A Firm data appendix
Data cleaning.
• We replace negative values with missing ones in the following variables: fixed tangible
capital stock, fixed intangible capital stock, net capital amortization.
• We drop observations with zero or missing sales for two consecutive years or with zero
or missing employment for two consecutive years if the firm operates in the construction
or housing sectors.
• We exclude holdings.
• We drop observations with negative values in debt, total assets, sales, or fixed capital.
• We drop observations where the current value of sales is positive but the lagged value of
sales is zero.
• We drop observations with missing values in at least one of the following variables:
investment rate, debt burden, debt rate, sales growth rate, cash flow, and size.
• We remove outliers by dropping observations with values lying in the 1st or 99th per-
centile of the distribution of relevant variables (dependent or explanatory variables).
• We restrict the sample of analysis to non-financial firms which are observed in the CBI
for at least two years. The structure of the panel is reported in Table 9.
Variables definition.
• Debt burden: interest payments plus financial costs divided by gross operating revenue
plus gross financial revenue.
• Profitability (ROA): sum of gross operating revenue plus gross financial revenue minus
financial costs and interest payments, divided by total assets.
• Debt ratio: total outstanding debt minus cash and its equivalents, divided by total assets.
• Cash flows: change in cash holdings relative to the previous year divided by total assets.
• Total capital stock: sum of fixed tangible capital stock (including real estate investment)
and fixed intangible capital stock.
• Gross investment rate: the sum of gross fixed tangible and intangible capital formation,
divided by the total capital stock.
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• Sales growth rate (at firm level): computed with respect to the previous year. The variable
takes a value of zero if firm sales are zero in two subsequent years.
• SME dummy: equal to one if the firm is an SME and zero otherwise. SME is based on
the definition of the European Commission (2003/361/CE): SMEs are firms with fewer
than 250 employees and fewer than 50 million euros of turnover or firms for which the
total balance sheet is lower than 43 million euros. The SME dummy variable takes a
value of one if the firm fulfills these conditions and zero otherwise.
• Corporative group dummy: equal to one if the firm belongs to a corporate group, zero
otherwise.
• Exporter dummy: This variable is derived from the Spanish Balance of Payments micro-
dataset. The dataset includes all firms that have exported with transaction values above
50,000 euros.
B Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3: Average gross investment rate in the sample.
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Table 8: Representativeness of the data
Panel A: Central Business Register (number of firms and share by employment type)
Firm size category 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1-9 employees 439093 454687 493184 521945 555442 592875 624678 651899 689095 719884 705950 685023 666620 658036 677207 669183
10-19 employees 64926 69861 71527 74900 77776 81561 84464 89009 92398 94092 87285 75394 72210 67271 62630 59365
20-49 employees 39681 43578 42416 44663 45405 46930 49705 51910 53764 54764 49089 42448 39956 37013 33804 32538
+ 50 employees 17716 19388 20434 21343 21790 21871 23043 24138 25470 26417 23700 21402 20373 19552 18566 17746
Total 561416 587514 627561 662851 700413 743237 781890 816956 860727 895157 866024 824267 799159 781872 792207 778832
Firm size category 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1-9 employees 78,21% 77,39% 78,59% 78,74% 79,30% 79,77% 79,89% 79,80% 80,06% 80,42% 81,52% 83,11% 83,42% 84,16% 85,48% 85,92%
10-19 employees 11,56% 11,89% 11,40% 11,30% 11,10% 10,97% 10,80% 10,90% 10,73% 10,51% 10,08% 9,15% 9,04% 8,60% 7,91% 7,62%
20-49 employees 7,07% 7,42% 6,76% 6,74% 6,48% 6,31% 6,36% 6,35% 6,25% 6,12% 5,67% 5,15% 5,00% 4,73% 4,27% 4,18%
+ 50 employees 3,16% 3,30% 3,26% 3,22% 3,11% 2,94% 2,95% 2,95% 2,96% 2,95% 2,74% 2,60% 2,55% 2,50% 2,34% 2,28%
Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
Panel B: Final Sample (number of firms and share by employment size)
Firm size category 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1-9 employees 29657 31354 31354 44444 56717 73997 109143 133427 151699 161031 168337 160527 184078 241324 257156 268597
10-19 employees 6168 7811 7811 12148 14729 17601 22026 25423 27800 28262 28381 26129 25709 30867 30852 29805
20-49 employees 4165 5135 5135 7577 8708 10006 12472 14407 15540 15778 15655 13902 13373 16455 16616 16115
+ 50 employees 1824 2051 2051 2241 2065 2202 2737 3329 3626 3699 3519 3137 4219 5064 5292 5547
Total 41814 46351 46351 66410 82219 103806 146378 176586 198665 208770 215892 203695 227379 293710 309916 320064
Firm size category 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1-9 employees 70,93% 67,64% 67,64% 66,92% 68,98% 71,28% 74,56% 75,56% 76,36% 77,13% 77,97% 78,81% 80,96% 82,16% 82,98% 83,92%
10-19 employees 14,75% 16,85% 16,85% 18,29% 17,91% 16,96% 15,05% 14,40% 13,99% 13,54% 13,15% 12,83% 11,31% 10,51% 9,95% 9,31%
20-49 employees 9,96% 11,08% 11,08% 11,41% 10,59% 9,64% 8,52% 8,16% 7,82% 7,56% 7,25% 6,82% 5,88% 5,60% 5,36% 5,03%
+ 50 employees 4,36% 4,42% 4,42% 3,37% 2,51% 2,12% 1,87% 1,89% 1,83% 1,77% 1,63% 1,54% 1,86% 1,72% 1,71% 1,73%
Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
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Table 9: Panel structure
Obs. per firm 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
Large 2,213 1,583 1,055 672 490 198 171 103 152 98 61 79 49 57 12 46 7,039
SMEs 127,238 101,866 82,640 74,866 56,134 43,763 35,562 28,403 21,782 16,586 12,412 8,918 5,072 4,236 1,117 1,335 621,930
All 129,451 103,449 83,695 75,538 56,624 43,961 35,733 28,506 21,934 16,684 12,473 8,997 5,121 4,293 1,129 1,381 628,969
Table 10: Means by export status
Not Exporters Diff. in Pval
Exporters Means
ROA 0.048 0.085 -0.038 0.000
debt burden 0.587 0.394 0.193 0.000
debt rate 0.696 0.601 0.095 0.000
cash flow -0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.000
sales growth 0.049 0.072 -0.023 0.000
SMEs 0.991 0.871 0.119 0.000
export 0.000 1.000 -1.000 .
corp group 0.002 0.075 -0.073 0.000
1(Gross Inv.> 0) 0.734 0.871 -0.137 0.000
Gross Inv.Rate 0.129 0.170 -0.042 0.000
N.Obs. 3,217,536 101,203
Table 11: Means by being part of corporate group status
Not part of Part of Diff. in Pval
corp_group corp_group Means
ROA 0.049 0.085 -0.037 0.000
debt burden 0.582 0.397 0.185 0.000
debt rate 0.694 0.577 0.116 0.000
cash flow -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.196
sales growth 0.050 0.026 0.023 0.000
SMEs 0.990 0.304 0.685 0.000
export 0.028 0.534 -0.506 0.000
corp_group 0.000 1.000 -1.000 .
1(Gross Inv.> 0) 0.738 0.892 -0.154 0.000
Gross Inv.Rate 0.130 0.146 -0.016 0.000
N.Obs. 3,304,558 14,181
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In this Section we run an exercise to get a sense of the magnitude of the direct contribution
of policy uncertainty to the evolution of the aggregate investment rate in the country. To do
this we compute the evolution of the average gross investment rate in the simulated situation
in which the policy uncertainty index is fixed at the value attained in 2006 for the period 2007-
2014. Results are depicted in Figure 4. The black line represents the evolution of the actual
average investment-to-capital ratio. The chart shows a sharp decline in investment from 2008,
with a mild recovery starting in 2013. The dashed blue line depicts the average predicted
evolution of the investment rate based on our baseline model, and is constructed in two steps.
First, we estimate Eq. 1 and obtain the predicted values for the investment ratio. Second,
we obtain yearly averages for this estimate. Finally, the dashed red line refers to the average
predicted values for the investment rate mimicking the previous aggregate until 2006, whereas
afterwards, we assume the uncertainty level to remain fixed at the year 2006 level.
Note that this exercise allows to get an idea of the direct effect of uncertainty on investment
during the crisis. This is because we set uncertainty at the pre-crisis level but leave unchanged
the other regressors. In this sense, we provide a lowerbound of the impact of uncertainty.
Figure 4: Predicted gross investment rate if policy uncertainty remains fixed at the level attained
in 2006 from 2007 onwards.
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C The role of policy uncertainty on the investment rate
D Corporate groups
Using the information from the CBI database, we construct a proxy for the cost of debt in
order to provide descriptive evidence about the relationship between belonging to a corporate
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group and the cost of accessing external finance. As previously mentioned, several authors
emphasize the potential benefits of conglomerates for access to credit. Inderst and Müller
(2003) and Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) suggest that associations entail a lower risk of
non-repayment than individual firms. Better access to credit may be also related to potential
debt coinsurance provided by the conglomerate structure (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2016;
Yan et al., 2010). However, other authors suggest that while conglomerates may bring the
benefits of economies of scale to the access to credit, contagion effects due to idiosyncratic
shocks among firms may prevail over coinsurance gains (Hege and Ambrus-lakatos, 2002).
Our cost of debt variable is defined in the following way:
Cost of debtit = 1/2× Interest paymentsit/ (Total debtit + Total debtit−1) (4)
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of our proxy for both groups of firms, as well as the proportion
of firms belonging to a corporate group. Several things are worth noting. First, we observe a
positive wedge in the cost of debt between firms belonging to a corporate group and the rest
of the corporations throughout the entire period. The difference is found to be significant even
after controlling for firm size, time dummies, and other possible determinants (see Table 12
below). Second, we find that the difference between the two groups becomes smaller after
the Great Recession. This occurs at the same time as a significant increase in the proportion
of firms belonging to corporate groups is taking place and could be related to a change in the
composition of the sample of firms that belong to each group.
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Figure 5: Average cost of debt and proportion of firms belonging to a corporate group
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Table 12: Descriptive evidence: Average cost of debt.
cost of debt (1)
corp-group -0.024∗∗∗
(0.001)
Large company -0.023∗∗∗
(0.001)
debt burden 0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
sales growth -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
ROA -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 3125532
R2 0.035
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note: OLS with time FEs and
control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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